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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Demography matters. The economy, labour market, healthcare, pensions, the
environment, intergenerational fairness and election results – they are all driven by
demography. The European Union (EU) has seen its population grow substantially – by
around a quarter in the five and a half decades since 1960 – and it currently stands at
over 500 million people. But the world population has grown faster, more than doubling
over the same timeframe and reaching around 7.3 billion today. And whilst the EU
population is now growing only slowly and is even expected to decline in the longer term,
the world population continues to grow strongly. Indeed, it is projected to pass 10 billion
in 2055. And despite world population growth being expected to slow, nonetheless it is
forecast to reach 11 billion people in 2100. So, the EU represents an ever-shrinking
proportion of the world population, at just 6.9 % today (down from 13.5 % in 1960), and
is projected to fall further to just 4.1 % by the end of this century.
In common with many other developed (and developing) parts of the world, the EU
population is also ageing, as life expectancy increases and fertility rates are lower than
in the past. At the EU level, both men and women have seen their average life expectancy
increase by over 10 years between the early 1960s and today, although women continue
to live longer than men on average. Meanwhile, the numbers of children being born has
fallen from an average in the EU-28 of around 2.5 children per woman in 1960 to a little
under 1.6 today. This is far below the 2.1 births per woman considered necessary in
developed countries to maintain the population in the long term in the absence of
migration. Indeed migration has become increasingly important to expanding or
maintaining the EU population. In both 2015 and 2016, the natural population change
(live births minus deaths) was slightly negative, and net inward migration was therefore
key to the population growth seen in those years.
Combined, these trends result in a dramatically ageing EU-28, whose working population
(aged 15 to 64) shrank for the first time in 2010 and is expected to decline every year to
2060. In contrast, the proportion of people aged 80 or over in the EU-28 population is
expected to more than double by 2050, reaching 11.4 %. In 2006 there were four people
of working age (15-64) for each person aged 65 or over – by 2050 this ratio is projected
to be just two people. This outlook is essentially set in the shorter term at least, meaning
the focus is on smoothing and adapting to older populations.
Whilst the starting point, speed and scale of ageing varies between the Member States,
depending on their different fertility rates, life expectancy and migration levels, all will
see further ageing in the coming years. Free movement, as well as external migration,
will also play a role, in both the population size and age profile of countries, and regions
within them. The 'in-focus' section of this analysis looks at health, and notes that the
data, whilst inconsistent, suggest that people are not necessarily experiencing extra life
years from increasing life expectancy without limitations on their activity.
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Glossary and list of main acronyms used
Demographic dividend: A demographic dividend appears when after a period of
demographic growth, the fertility rate substantially declines, thereby ensuring that the
number of children is lower than the number of working age adults. This, coupled with a small
number of older people, leads to a low dependency rate, which can be particularly beneficial
for economic development.
G20: The Group of Twenty (G20) brings together the world's major advanced and emerging
economies, comprising the European Union (EU) and 19 country members.
Healthy life years: According to Eurostat, the number of years that a person is expected to
continue to live in a healthy condition and free from disability. Also called disability-free life
expectancy.
Life expectancy: According to Eurostat, life expectancy at a certain age is the mean
additional number of years that a person of that age can expect to live, if subjected
throughout the rest of his or her life to the current mortality conditions (age-specific
probabilities of dying, i.e. the death rates observed for the current period).
Migrants: People arriving or returning from abroad to take up residence in a country for a
certain period, having previously been resident elsewhere. The term EU-citizen is based on
the notion of citizenship that is defined as the particular legal bond between an individual
and her or his state, acquired by birth or naturalisation, either by declaration, choice,
marriage or other means under national legislation. Third country national is defined as any
person who is not a citizen of the European Union, including stateless persons – see
Article 2.1 (i) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 (Eurostat).
Multi-morbidity: the presence of two or more chronic medical conditions in an individual.
Natural replacement rate: the average number of live births needed per woman to keep the
population size constant over the long run in the absence of migration. According to Eurostat
'a total fertility rate of around 2.1 live births per woman is considered to be the replacement
level in developed countries'.
Prevalence: the total number of individuals in a population who have a disease or health
condition at a specific period of time, usually expressed as a percentage of the population.
Total age-dependency ratio: According to Eurostat, total age-dependency ratio 'relates the
number of individuals who are likely to be 'dependent' on the support of others for their daily
living – the young and the elderly – to the number of those individuals who are capable of
providing this support'. It therefore compares the sum of those aged 0-14 years old and those
aged 65 or over on the one hand with the number of those aged 15-64 considered to be of
working age. The total age-dependency ratio is the sum of the two ratios, the young-age-
dependency ratio and the old-age-dependency ratio which, respectively, compare (i) the
number of those aged 0-14 to the number of those 15-64 and (ii) the number of those aged
65 and over to the number of those aged 15-64.
Total fertility rate: Eurostat defines the total fertility rate as the mean number of children
who would be born to a woman during her lifetime, if she were to spend her childbearing
years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates that have been measured in a given year.
UNDESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Youth bulge: is defined by a large share of the population comprised of children and young
adults (World Bank).
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1. Introduction
The demographic structure of the European Union (EU) and its development are of huge
consequence for the EU and its citizens in a host of areas, including: healthcare; pensions;
the labour market; the economy; the environment; intergenerational fairness; election
results; and the EU's very place in the world. So demography and how it is changing
matters – indeed, 'demography is destiny'.1
1.1. Historical population growth in EU-28 now levelling off
The population of the European Union (EU-28) has grown from 406.7 million in 1960 to
511.8 million in 2017. Yet there were only 5.1 million live births in 2016 compared to the
7.6 million in 1961. With 4.1 million deaths in 1961, the natural population increase at
that time was 3.5 million people. In contrast, the (just over) 5.1 million deaths in 2016
meant there was a slight decline in the natural population for that year.2 Eurostat's
baseline projections suggest that the EU-28 population will grow more slowly than in the
past, peaking at 528.5 million in 2050 before declining to 518.8 million by 2080.
Figure 1 – EU-28 and world population (1960=100)
Source: GlobalStat based on UNDESA data.
Note: Projections (2016 onwards, shown with dotted line) use the UN 'medium fertility variant' scenario.3
At the same time the world population has risen much more dramatically, from a little
over 3 billion in 1960 to 7.3 billion in 2015, and is projected to rise further still, passing
10 billion in 2055 to over 11 billion in 2100 (see Figure 1). Therefore, even when it was
growing strongly, the EU-28 population comprised an ever-shrinking proportion of the
world population, down from 13.5 % in 1960 to 6.9 % in 2015 – and it is projected to be
1 The quote is often attributed to the French philosopher A. Comte (1798-1857), although some suggest it
was coined much more recently.
2 Figures from Eurostat [demo_gind]. Natural population change is the difference between the number of
live births and deaths during a given time period (usually one year), which can be either positive or
negative.
3 The medium fertility variant scenario assumes that fertility in each country will converge towards
replacement level (Population Analysis for Policies & Programmes). The results presented above for future
years are based on the medium fertility variant projections of the 2017 Revision of the United Nations
World Population Prospects, according to which global fertility is projected to fall from just over 2.5 births
per woman in 2010-2015 to around 2.2 in 2045-2050 and 2.0 in 2095-2100 (for further information
see Word Population Prospects: 2017 Revision, UNDESA, 2017).
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smaller still at just 4.9 % in 2055 and 4.1 % in 21004 (see section 2.3 for more on EU in
the world).
1.2. Dramatic and continuing ageing of the EU population
Within the EU population, the age profile has undergone massive change and is expected
to evolve still further. In short, Europe is ageing dramatically, driven by significant
increases in life expectancy and lower birth rates:
• The median age in the EU-28 has risen from 38.3 years in 2001 to 42.6 in 2016;5
a 4.3 year increase in just 15 years.
• In 2004, there were, for the first time ever, as many elderly people (age 65+) as
children (0-14) in the EU-28.6
• The proportion of people aged 80 or over in the EU-28 population is expected to
more than double by 2050 (from 5.4 % of the population in 2016 to 11.4 % in
2050).7
• The EU-28 working population (defined as those aged 15 to 64) shrank for the
first time in 2010 and is expected to decline every year to 2060.8
1.3. Focus on adapting to ageing demographics
Policies to alter future demographics are limited and insofar as they are effective they
take time to have an impact. For instance, policies which seek to encourage people to
have, or have more, children through better support for families, or which encourage
young people from third countries with sought-after skills to migrate to the EU. The
demographic outlook is essentially set, at least in the short to medium-term, therefore,
over this period the focus will be about adapting and smoothing the transition to an older
EU.
2. Current situation
2.1. An ageing EU population
Figure 2 shows the population pyramid for 2001 and 2016, giving the distribution of the
population of women and men across various age groups. Such figures get their name
from the classic shape these often take, with longer bars at the bottom (representing
large numbers of people in the younger age groups) and shorter bars at the top (the older
age groups, containing fewer people). However in 2001 the shape of the EU-28
population is far from the classic pyramid. In 2016 it is further away still, with the top
parts of the 'pyramid' being broader, due in part to people living longer on average than
previously9 (see section 2.2.1 'Increasing life expectancy'). The lower parts of the
'pyramid' are also narrower due to people having fewer children than in the past,
4 Note for the EU-28 UNDESA figures are: 409.1m (1960) 507.5m (2015) 497.7m (2055) 462.0m (2100).
5 Source Eurostat population structure and ageing.
6 Eurostat 'Being young in Europe today - demographic trends’, March 2015.
7 Source Eurostat.
8 According to page 43 of 'Demography Report 2015' Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs
and Inclusion (DG EMPL), European Commission.
9 Note the very top bar on the pyramid also represents the only open-ended age group, covering all those
aged 85 and over, whereas all the other bars represent age groups covering fixed five year spans.
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including total fertility rates falling below the natural replacement rate. However, the
similar size of the bottom two age bands show this has stabilised in recent years (see
section 2.2.2 'low fertility rates').
The impact of higher past fertility rates is also clearly seen in the figure, in the bulge
caused by the so-called 'baby-boomer' generation. The baby-boomer cohort stems from
high fertility rates in a number of EU countries in the years following the Second World
War. Subsequent declines in fertility rates meant fewer children joining the bottom of
the pyramid after the baby-boomer cohort, hence the boomer cohort formed a
population bulge that moved up the 'pyramid' as they aged. As this outsized cohort have
now reached, or are reaching, retirement age, they have expanded the numbers in the
older age groups, skewing the age structure of the EU population towards an older
Europe.10
Another notable feature of the older age groups is that women are more prevalent in
these groups, reflecting their greater longevity (on average) than men. Although this
gender disparity in life expectancy has narrowed somewhat, it is currently expected to
continue with the EU-28 average life expectancy at birth in 2015 estimated at 83.3 years
for women but only 77.9 for men.11
Figure 2 – Population pyramids EU-28, 2001 and 2016 (numbers of women and men by age
tranches)
Source: GlobalStat based on Eurostat data.
Looking at projections of the future age structure in the EU in 2020 and 2080
(see Figure 3), we can see that the shape is expected to change further as the baby-
10 Whilst there is no agreed definition of 'baby-boomer', it typically refers to those born in the final years
of the Second World War, up until around the mid-1960s, a period which saw high birth rates in many EU
and other western countries. More information: 'The greying of the baby boomers', Eurostat, 2011.
11 Eurostat life expectancy by age and sex [demo_mlexpec].
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boomer bulge leaves the picture. Together with longer lifespans enlarging the proportion
of the population in the older age group, a more rectangular shape associated with a
stagnating or slow growing population takes hold. The open-ended nature of the oldest
age group of 85 years and over (rather than the fixed five year spans of all the others)
accounts for the fact this age group is the most numerous.
Figure 3 – Population pyramids, EU-28, 2020 and 2080 (numbers of women and men by age
tranches)
Source: GlobalStat based on Eurostat data.
An important measure of the age structure of a population is the total age-dependency
ratio (see glossary). In 2001 the total dependency ratio for the EU-28 was 48.9 %,
meaning there were around two people of working age (15-64) for every younger or
older person likely to be dependent on them (i.e. aged 0-14 or 65 and over). Breaking
this down, the old-age dependency ratio (those 65 and over compared to those 15-64)
was 23.5 %, so there were more than four people aged 15-64 for each person aged 65 or
over. The young-age dependency ratio (those aged 0-14 compared to those 15-64) was
25.2 %, meaning there were four people of working age for each person aged 0-14.12
In 2016, the total dependency ratio for the EU-28 had increased to 53.2 %. Breaking this
down, the old-age dependency ratio was now 29.3 %, meaning between three and four
people of working age (15-64) for each person aged 65 or over. Rather more precisely,
this represents around seven working age people for every two people aged 65 or over.
The young-age dependency ratio was 23.9 %, meaning more than four people of working
age for each person aged 0-14.13Not only was there a growing proportion of people likely
to be dependent on the working age population overall, but this was therefore skewed
towards those aged 65 plus, rather than children aged 0-14, who would at least in the
future form part of the working age population potentially supporting others.
12 Eurostat [demo_pjanind].
13 Eurostat [demo_pjanind].
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Projections suggest that the worsening of the total age-dependency ratio will accelerate
dramatically, with the ratio reaching 63.5 % as soon as 2030. It will continue to increase
rapidly reaching 76.5 % in 2050 before increasing more slowly, nudging 80 % (projection
79.7 %) in 2080.14 At these levels, there would only be around five people of working age
(15-64) for every four people older or younger than this age band. This shift has serious
implications across a range of areas, including the economy, labour market, healthcare
and pensions.
Once again, the main driver for changes in the total age-dependency ratio is the old-age
dependency ratio, which is projected to reach 39.1 % in 2030 and 50.3 % in 2050.15 That
means by 2050 there will then be just two people of working age (15-64) for every person
aged 65 or over, a dramatic shift from the situation in 2001 when there were over four
working age people for each person aged 65 or over. In contrast the young-age
dependency ratio is projected to increase relatively slowly, to 24.4 % in 2030, 26.2 % in
2050 and 27.4 % in 2080.
These EU-28 level figures tell a clear story on aggregate and this broad message of
population ageing also holds across all 28 Member States taken individually, without
exception. However, differences exist in terms of degree and timing.
Figure 4 – Median age of the population (years) in EU 28 Member States in 1970 and
2016
Source GlobalStat based on Eurostat data. [demo_pjanind].
Notes: (1) France in 1970 is for metropolitan France. (2) East and West Germany presented the same data in 1970. (3)
Data for 1970 is not available for Cyprus, Malta, Croatia and Slovenia.
Figure 4 shows the median age of the population in each of the EU-28 Member States in
1970 (where data is available) and 2016. This shows the rather different starting points
in 1970, ranging from Ireland with a median age of just 27.4 years to the comparatively
old 35.5 year median age in Sweden. By 2016, the median age of the population has
increased in all the Member States. Ireland's population remains the youngest in the
EU-28, at 36.6 years, despite having aged substantially. However, Sweden's population
14 Eurostat [proj_15ndbims].
15 Eurostat.
Demographic outlook in the European Union 2017 Page 9 of 32
now has the seventh lowest median age at 40.9 years, having experienced the second
smallest increase (of 5.4 years) in median age of the EU-28 in the intervening years. The
German population, at 45.8 years, now has the highest median age having seen a
substantial increase in the median age of its population of 11.8 years since 1970.
However, six Member States16 (of those with data available for both years) saw even
bigger increases than Germany, albeit from a lower base. These variations in ageing
between Member States will continue in the future. According to Eurostat projections,
from 2018, Italy will have the highest median age at 46.3 years and will go on to be the
first Member State to reach a median age of 50, in 2029.17 Greece is expected to take
over from the early 2030s, reaching a median age of 52.7 years in 2040, then falling back
to 52.3 years in 2050 (whilst maintaining the highest median age in the EU). These past
and (projected) future differences are the product of the varying starting points and
evolutions of fertility rates, life expectancy and migration in the Member States (see
section 2.2).
2.2. Drivers of population change
Population change is driven by changes in how long people live (life expectancy), birth-
rates (fertility rates) and the movement of people within and between regions and
countries (free movement and migration). These factors are briefly discussed below,
along with the regional dimensions of population change.
2.2.1. Increasing life expectancy
In the last decades, life expectancy has increased continuously in most developed
countries, including in the EU, due to a number of reasons.18 Whether this trend will
continue concerns not only individual citizens, but also governments, given the impacts
across a range of public policy areas.
Life expectancy
Life expectancy at birth is the average number of years a new-born is expected to live, under the
assumption that prevailing patterns of mortality stay the same throughout her or his life.
Any other age may be used to calculate the life expectancy from that point on, using current
conditions. That age plus the remaining life expectancy then equals the total expected life span.
See Figures 5 and 6 for the change in female and male life expectancy from 1960 onwards.
Eurostat data for the EU-28 is currently available from 2002 to 201519 for the commonly
used indicator 'life expectancy at birth'. Figures show an initial slowing of the growth rate
followed by a slight fall in life expectancy in 2015. While this decline is small – less than
the change from 2013 to 2014 for the EU-28 – it is a variation in the pattern and only
future observation will show if it is a new trend or merely a 'glitch'. Scientific studies
available at present have not yet taken into account the data from 2015. A widely-cited
16 Portugal (14.6 years), The Netherlands (13.9 years), Finland (13.1 years), Italy (12.8 years), Spain
(12.6 years) and Lithuania (12.4 years).
17Eurostat [proj_15ndbims]. More discussion on Member States' histories of ageing and future
developments using various metrics (and noting the need to treat projections with caution) is available
here: 'The greying of the baby boomers', G. Lanzieri, Eurostat, 2011.
18 These gains in life expectancy can be attributed to a number of factors, including improved education,
socio-economic conditions and lifestyle, as well as progress in health care. OECD/European Union, Health
at a Glance: Europe 2016, 2016, p. 56.
19 Eurostat, Life expectancy by age and sex, [demo-mlexpec].
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article20 from 2017 (not including the 2015 data) suggests that average life expectancy
will continue to rise. While current debates involve the recent change in the statistical
data with the slight fall in life expectancy in 2015, it is yet to be determined whether life
expectancy will revert to increasing (indefinitely, or at least to a certain age at present
only reached by few people). Only future data can prove if a new trend indeed exists.
Figure 5 – Average female and male life expectancy at birth
Source: GlobalStat based on UNDESA data (from 2015 onwards: the 'medium fertility variant' scenario).
Taking a look further back, with data from UNDESA's World Population Prospects 2017,21
life expectancy has risen rather dramatically (see Figure 5). On average for the EU-28,
women's life expectancy at birth increased from 72.4 years (1960-65 period) to
82.7 years (2015-2020 period) – an increase of 10.3 years. The equivalent figures for men
are 67.0 years and 77.1 years – an increase of 10.1 years.
As briefly mentioned in section 2.1, women have a greater life expectancy than men. This
gap is a worldwide phenomenon,22 indicating that gender specific characteristics,
biological as well as behavioural, social and life circumstances, have an influence. Life
expectancy also varies significantly between EU Member States today. Women born in
the 1960-1965 period started out with approximately 72 years of life expectancy in all
EU Member States. But for the 2015-2020 period there is up to 7.6 years difference
between Member States' life expectancy averages for women. Figure 5 shows a similar
20 V. Kontis et al., Future life expectancy in 35 industrialised countries, The Lancet, vol. 389, 2017, pp. 1323-
1335.
21 The 2017 Revision of World Population Prospects is the 25th round of official United Nations population
estimates and projections that have been prepared by the Population Division of the Department of
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.
22 Gender, aging and longevity in humans: an update of an intriguing/neglected scenario paving the way
to a gender-specific medicine, R. Ostan et al., Clinical Science, 130(19), 2016, pp. 1711-1725.
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if even more distinct scenario for men, with a difference of 11.7 years for the 2015-2020
period.
There is also a growing focus on life expectancy for later age brackets. A reason for this
is the increase23 in the proportion and absolute number of older people in the population
and the impact of this increase on society and economies. People aged 60 or over made
up24 25.3 % of the population of the EU-28 on 1 January 2016.
Figure 6 – Average female and male life expectancy at age 60 (years)
Source: GlobalStat based on UNDESA data (from 2015 onwards: the 'medium fertility variant' scenario).
Life expectancy at age 60 years has also risen rather dramatically (see Figure 6). On
average for the EU-28, women's life expectancy at age 60 increased from 18.8 years
(1960-1965 period) to 24.9 years (2015-2020 period) – an increase of 6.1 years. The
equivalent figures for men are 15.9 years and 21.1 years – an increase of 5.2 years.
Therefore, as with life expectancy at birth, women do better than men regarding life
expectancy at age 60. Once again, life expectancy also varies significantly between EU
Member States today, with the 2015-2020 period showing a 6.1 year difference between
the highest and lowest Member State averages of life expectancy for women. Figure 6
shows a similar scenario for men, with a difference of 7 years for the same 2015-2020
period.
It is possible to tie variations in life expectancy to levels of education,25 income and
occupation.26 For example, life expectancy by educational attainment is one of the
23 United Nations, World Population Ageing 2015 Report, 2015.
24 Eurostat, Population structure and ageing, [demo_pjanind].
25 W. C. Sanderson, S. Scherbov, A New Perspective on Patterns of Aging in Europe by Education and
Gender, Journal of Population Ageing, vol. 9, iss. 3, September 2016, pp. 207-225.
26 Evidence shows that higher socio-economic groups live longer than those in lower socio-economic
groups ....OECD, OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2016, 2016, p. 177.
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European Core Health Indicators (ECHI). Causes for change in life expectancy at older age
can be considered broadly in six categories27 of diseases. Among other factors,
developments in medicine and healthcare have an impact on the prevalence of these
health issues. However, living longer does not necessarily mean living in good health. For
more insight on healthy life expectancy, see section 3 'Focus on Health'.
2.2.2. Low fertility rates
Fertility rates have declined in the EU-28 since the mid-1960s (see Figure 5). The EU-28
as a whole had a total fertility rate above 2.1 live births per woman until the mid-1970s,
falling below this level in 1975. Rates continued to decline further, bottoming out at
around 1.45 in the mid-1990s. They then maintained this low level (even falling to 1.44
in 1998 and 1999) until the early 2000s saw a modest recovery, reaching 1.50 in 2005
before climbing to 1.61 in 2010. Subsequently total fertility rates for the EU-28 have
fallen back slightly, dipping to 1.55 in 2013, and they currently stand at 1.58 (in 2015).
Total fertility rates in the world as a whole have also been on a generally declining trend,
albeit from a much higher starting point of around 5 live births per women in 1960. They
fell below 4 in 1977 and to under 3 by 1994 and currently (2015) stand at 2.45. See
section 2.3 for more on the EU situation in comparison to other parts of the world.
Figure 7 – Total fertility rate (births per woman)
Source: GlobalStat based on Word Bank World Development Indicators data.28
In terms of number of live births, during the period 1961–2016 the highest annual total
in the EU-28 was recorded in 1964, at 7.8 million. By contrast, in 2016 there were just
5.1 million live births – less than two thirds of the 1964 peak – despite the EU-28
population having grown in the meantime by around one quarter, to 511.8 million
27 Communicable diseases and nutritional deficiencies, cancers, cardiovascular diseases and diabetes
mellitus, chronic respiratory diseases, other non-communicable diseases, and injuries. C.D. Mather et al.,
Causes of international increases in older age life expectancy, The Lancet, vol. 385, 2015, pp. 540-548.
28 1) United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects, (2) Census reports and other
statistical publications from national statistical offices, (3) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (4) United
Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Report (various years), (5) US Census Bureau:
International Database, and (6) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography
Programme.
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people.29 With deaths in the EU-28 in 2016 slightly over 5.1 million, this meant a
reduction in the natural population of the EU-28 that year for only the second time since
the data series began in 1961.30 However, whilst the gap between births and deaths has
been substantial in the past, it has been reducing and narrowed considerably by the mid-
1990s. Since then, the gap has remained narrow, barring a period in the mid to late-
2000s where increasing live births, peaking in 2008, widened the gap somewhat before
falling back.
With falling numbers of children being born in the EU-28, the relative importance of
migration in increasing or maintaining the EU-28 population has grown (see section 2.2.4
on migration). Migration can also have second order effects, at least for a period, by
raising the total fertility rate where, for a variety of reasons, migrants may display fertility
rates higher than the native population.31 Numbers of new-borns may also be boosted
from a possible disproportion between the child-bearing age of the migrant population
compared to the native population as a whole, thereby adding to the stock of potential
parents.
Declining fertility rates compared to past periods not only mean slower (or no)
population growth, but also affect the age profile of the EU-28 (see section 2.1). Together
with increasing life expectancy (see section 2.2.1) these past falls in fertility rates drive
the dramatic ageing of the EU population.
Map 1 – Total fertility rates in EU-28 Member States in 2015
Source: Eurostat
29 All figures from Eurostat [demo_gind], population total (estimated, provisional) as at 1 January 2017.
30 The other year seeing a reduction in the natural population was 2015.
31 For instance page 45 of the 'Eurostat regional yearbook 2017 edition' notes that '...several of these
regions [those with the highest fertility rates] were characterised by relatively high levels of migrants'.
Demographic outlook in the European Union 2017 Page 14 of 32
Looking below the EU-28 level (see Map 1) we see considerable variation in fertility rates.
France (at 1.96) had the highest total fertility rate in 2015, whilst Portugal had the lowest
(at 1.31). Other Member States with relatively high fertility rates included Ireland (1.92),
Sweden (1.85) and the United Kingdom (1.80). At the other end of the scale, with
Portugal, were Poland and Cyprus (both 1.32), Greece and Spain (both 1.33), and Italy
(1.35).32 Fertility rates are falling worldwide and are associated with growing economic
and social development. However, research suggests that once a certain level of
development is achieved, fertility rates may stabilise or recover to some extent. The
interactions between policies to support families and diverging fertility rates do not
suggest clear solutions, although a common characteristic among countries with stable
or even increasing birth rates is a high degree of female labour force participation.33
2.2.3. Demographic implications at the EU regional and local level
Demographic trends affect EU regions in a variety of ways and hence there is no 'one size
fits all' description of demographic developments. Nevertheless, a few basic
demographic generalisations can be made.
Population decline can be observed across parts of Eastern Europe – the Baltic States,
Bulgaria, Romania, Eastern Germany, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Croatia and the
central regions of France. However, recent immigration trends stemming from non-EU
countries have altered the demographic balance in various EU regions. Map 2 presents
the crude rate of total population change in 2015. The blue coloured areas show the EU
NUTS level 3 regions34 where the population grew, whereas the red areas show those
where populations declined.35
32 Eurostat [demo_frate].
33 'Mission Not Accomplished', Population Europe, 2011; 'Policies for families: is there a best practice?'
Population Europe, 2016.
34 NUTS is the Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, a geographical nomenclature subdividing the
economic territory of the European Union (EU) into regions at three different levels (NUTS 1, 2 and 3
respectively, moving from larger to smaller territorial units).
35 Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2017, European Commission, pp.32-49.
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Map 2 – Crude rate of total population change in NUTS 3 regions 2015
Source: Eurostat Regional Yearbook, 2017, p. 40.
Important demographic contrasts can be observed between the core and periphery,
both in the EU and also within EU Member States. In the EU, considerable population
growth has been recorded in Western Ireland, the south of the United Kingdom, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Austria and in metropolitan centres, such as Paris and London. Parts of
Western Germany also seem to benefit from population growth, as do Northern Italy,
and the southern part of Scandinavia.
Overall, trends show that there is an increasing concentration of population in certain
urban areas (especially capital cities) vis-à-vis depopulation phenomena in rural,
mountainous, sparsely populated areas, while certain coastal areas have also seen a
population increase. Towns and cities in EU regions lagging behind economically also
tend to lose population. Peripheral and rural areas, as well as post-industrial urban and
mountain areas, are more at risk of depopulation.36
Regions which lose population tend to be rural, already sparsely populated and remote.
However, declining industrial areas and various peripheral towns are also affected by
depopulation trends. However, rural regions which are close to dynamic urban centres,
areas within commuting distance or which enjoy good transport connections with them
can experience good population development. Regions with high unemployment often
have declining and ageing populations. Highly skilled professionals are often attracted to
regions of considerable economic growth. Therefore, people tend to move wherever
there are jobs, career opportunities and favourable economic prospects. For instance,
within Europe, movements of young educated professionals from Southern Europe to
North Western Europe have been recorded since the beginning of the economic crisis.
36 'How can regional and cohesion policies tackle demographic challenges?', Directorate-General for
Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2013.
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The preferred destinations of immigration from outside the EU are also the wealthiest
European regions.37
In recent years more than three quarters of the total population increase in the EU
resulted from net inward migration.38 The latest statistics suggest that although this
trend continues strongly, it is uneven and directed to certain EU Member States. For
instance, in 2015, the fastest expanding populations were often concentrated in
Germany or Austria, while there was also relatively high population growth in the south-
eastern corner of the United Kingdom, the southern regions of the Nordic Member
States, as well as several regions in Belgium, France and Luxembourg.39 Nevertheless,
immigrants may only temporarily ease the problem of ageing in particular regions, as in
the long-term they will gradually become older themselves.
The 'attractiveness' of a particular region matters when it comes to maintaining and
attracting population. This relates not only to job prospects and growth, but also to wider
'quality of life' factors. For instance, various parts of the Mediterranean, such as coastal
towns, have been successful in increasing their share of population although they did not
initially constitute poles of economic growth. Regions which may offer good job
prospects are appealing to young professionals and therefore have a high degree of
'attractiveness'.40
Population trends may cause a number of issues. For instance, overconcentration of
population in certain urban areas has already led to undesirable side-effects: congestion,
rising housing/transport prices, pollution, deterioration of quality of life, urban sprawl,
or exclusion of less well-off people and families from the city centres. On the other hand,
certain EU areas that suffer from depopulation may encounter problems such as a
stagnating economy, lack of professional opportunities and increasing poverty. In
addition, certain of these areas may face issues of inadequate health coverage, as public
health provisions tend to decline and private health service practitioners find operations
in these areas unprofitable.41
Other less predictable factors, such as natural disasters and climate change, may have a
considerable impact on the population of EU regions.42
2.2.4. Migration
Migration to the EU from third countries and free movement within the EU play a central
role in shaping the demographics of the European Union and the individual Member
States. Ever since the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds, EU citizen movement has
increased, in particular from east to west, reducing the population of some Member
States, while increasing that of others. According to Eurostat, 35.1 million people born
outside the EU-28 were living in an EU Member State on 1 January 2016, while
19.3 million persons were born in a different EU Member State to that in which they
were resident. These 54.4 million people residing outside their country of birth
37 The Spatial Effects of Demographic Trends and Migration, ESPON, 2002.
38 How can regional and cohesion policies tackle demographic challenges, op.cit., p. 21.
39 Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2017, p. 39.
40 The impact of demographic change on European regions, Committee of the Regions, p. 22.
41 For further analysis see: V. Margaras, Sparsely populated and underpopulated areas, EPRS, European
Parliament, 2016.
42 Increasing risk over time of weather-related hazards to the European population: a data-driven
prognostic study, G. Forzieri, A. Cescatti, F. Batista e Silva, L. Feyen, The Lancet, Vol 1, no 5, pp. 200-208,
August 2017.
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accounted for 10.7 % of the total EU population of 510.3 million people on
1 January 2016. In 2016, the stock of foreign population within the EU was unevenly
distributed among Member States, especially for third country nationals (see Figure 8).43
The above figures clearly show that, in addition to free movement-based internal flows,
Europe has received large numbers of immigrants from outside Europe for many
decades. Indeed each year, the EU receives significant numbers of regular workers,
family members and students: in the three year period from 2014 to 2016 alone, 2 million
first residency permits were issued on average per year to third country nationals.
Moreover, migration flows from outside the EU also consist of large numbers of people
fleeing war and violence: in the same triennium from 2014 to 2016, 1.5 million irregular
migrants, many of whom were in need of international protection, entered the EU via
Italy and Greece through the Mediterranean route, subsequently requesting asylum in
other northern and western EU Member States. This inflow of particularly vulnerable
people, often relying on smugglers and traffickers to reach their European destinations,
was unprecedented in volume. Admission numbers nevertheless vary between EU
Member States, with an EU average of about 2 599 applicants per million inhabitants.44
43 See 'Building a People’s Europe', European University Institute, May 2017; 'Migration and migrant
population statistics', Eurostat, September 2017.
44 See 'The integration of migrants and refugees: An EUI Forum on migration, citizenship and demography',
European University Institute, January 2017; 'Residence permits statistics', referring to the period from
1 January 2014 to 31 December 2016, Eurostat, September 2017; UNHCR Mediterranean Situation,
September 2017; Infographic 'Recent migration flows to the EU', EPRS, European February 2017.
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Figure 8 – Foreign population (other EU Member State nationals and non-EU nationals) residing
in each Member State in 2016
Source: GlobalStat based on Eurostat data [migr_pop3ctb].
As noted in section 2.1, decreasing birth rates and rising life expectancy are leading to
the dramatic ageing of the EU population. The European labour force (aged 20-64) is
expected to decline by 8.2 % (or by around 19 million people) between 2023 and 2060.
This shrinking working age population has to sustain pension and health care services for
a rapidly growing number of pensioners. Moreover, a predominantly older workforce
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might translate into a deficit of new skills required for innovation alongside serious
labour shortages and great difficulties in sustaining European welfare states.45
Migration, therefore, can contribute to the mitigation of the important demographic
challenges the EU faces. Neighbouring regions to the south will rank among the areas
with the lowest average age. The scenario of an ageing Europe and a youth bulge in the
Middle East and North Africa seems to have some potential for beneficial cooperation
across the Mediterranean. The recent wave of migrants and refugees consists primarily
of younger working-age people and can therefore help ease the effects of the ageing
population. However, the European economy is expected to generate employment for
skilled workers and see a decline in low-skilled categories of employment, whilst
immigrants may not necessarily have the skills profile that the knowledge economy will
need. Such factors, combined with the sheer scale of the ageing challenge the EU faces,
make it clear that increasing immigration per se cannot fully compensate for the effects
of ageing societies.46
Clearly, the initial impact of asylum seekers and refugees, in particular that of highly-skilled
people, on the labour force depends on the official recognition of asylum-seekers as
refugees, and the length of the application process. These factors vary considerably by
country of origin, country of destination –the Member State in the EU case – and over time.
Refugee employment rates lag behind those of labour migrants and, in some Member
States, of family migrants – not to mention natives. In 2014, in 12 European countries an
average 55 % of working age (15-64 years) beneficiaries of international protection were
in employment, compared to 58 % of family migrants, 73 % of labour migrants and 83 %
of those who entered these countries thanks to internal employer sponsorship; while the
general employment rate in the EU was 64.9 %.47 More broadly, comparing non-EU
nationals and EU nationals, over the past eight years, non-EU nationals systematically
recorded lower activity rates than EU nationals. As recently reported-, the gap increased
from 3 percentage points (pp) in 2008 to 8 pp in 2015 compared with EU nationals and
from 6 pp in 2008 to 12 pp in 2015 compared with EU nationals from other Member States.
In 2016, the employment rate in the EU reached 71.1 %.48
2.3. EU in the world
As noted in the introduction, while the EU faces demographic decline and ageing, the
world's population continues to grow (see section 1.1 and Figure 1). How does the EU
stand demographically, in relation with its main economic competitors – the non-EU G20
countries? What can the EU learn from other ageing societies? How will global
demographic growth impact the EU?
45 See 'The 2015 Ageing Report', European Commission, 2015; 'Building a People’s Europe', European
University Institute, May 2017.
46 See E. Noonan, 'Migration and the EU: A long-term perspective', EPRS, European Parliament, May 2016;
'Building a People’s Europe', European University Institute, May 2017.
47 The 12 European countries examined are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom, see 'Migrant integration 2017 Edition',
Eurostat, October 2017.
48 See 'How will the refugee surge affect the European economy?', Organization for Economic
Development and Cooperation, Migration Policy Debates, November 2015; M.V. Desiderio, 'Integrating
Refugees into Host Country Labor Markets: Challenges and Policy Options', Migration Policy Institute,
Washington DC, October 2016; 'Migrant integration 2017 Edition', Eurostat, October 2017; Europe 2020
indicators – employment.
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2.3.1. Demographic evolution in the G20
The non-EU G20 countries provide an interesting reference point for comparison with
the EU. An informal forum for international cooperation composed of 19 major
economies, including the four biggest EU economies – Germany, France, Italy and the
United Kingdom – plus the European Union itself, the G20 currently produces around
85 % of the world's GDP and is home to two thirds of the world's population. According
to the medium variant estimates of the UN Population Division in its most recent
report,49 the EU's population will slowly and continuously decline this century, in contrast
to the majority of the non-EU G20 countries, whose population will grow (see Figure 9).
Figure 9 – EU and other G20 countries – demographic forecasts for the 21st century
Data source: UN Population Division, The 2017 Revision of World Population Prospects.
Comparing the EU with other 'advanced economies'50 in the group, the EU belongs to the
group with shrinking populations, albeit shrinking at a slower pace than Japan and South
Korea.51 Among the non-EU G20 advanced economies (which, beyond some EU
countries, include Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and the USA), Japan, the most
49 The demographic data in this section are based on the 2017 Revision of World Population Prospects, UN
Population Division, June 2017.
50 The term 'advanced economies' was coined by the IMF.
51 Nevertheless, note that demographic forecasts for the three G20 countries expected to record the
highest relative demographic growth, the USA, Canada and Australia, are based on the assumption that
growth will be driven mainly by migration. This cannot be taken for granted in the current political context.
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intensely ageing society in the world, is expected to record the strongest population
decline by the end of the century. Its working age population is already shrinking. The
Japanese response to related challenges therefore deserves attention. Japan tries to use
the opportunities an ageing population provides, for example by driving automation and
robotics in a number of sectors or through retaining some older people longer in the
work force, to substitute for a shrinking work force. The Japanese people are also
enjoying the benefits of a shrinking population, such as greater housing availability.
However, the challenges ageing brings are undeniable, and for the first time in history
the country is considering opening up to migration, particularly in the health sector.
Looking at the emerging non-EU G20 countries, they are generally expected to see their
populations grow further, with the notable exceptions of China and possibly Brazil. China
stands in strong contrast to India, the other demographic giant of the group, and
demographic trends do not bode well for China's economy.52 China's working age
population is expected to start contracting by 2020. The recent termination of the one
child policy failed to increase births to the level expected by the government. The UN
predicts that India will overtake China in terms of population in 2024, and will continue
growing demographically for some time, albeit slowly. Nevertheless, it is a matter of
debate whether India will be able to exploit its 'demographic dividend' to drive its
economic transformation. A skilled workforce is believed to be an essential prerequisite,
and India has the largest illiterate population in the world.
2.3.2. Developing countries: between ageing populations and youth bulges
Many of the developing countries, particularly in Latin America and South-East Asia, will
see their population get older and more or less stagnate or shrink – and this could happen
before they become wealthy.53 In the global comparison, however, one entire continent
stands apart: Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa will be the demographic engine of the world in
the 21st century. Sub-Saharan Africa's population is projected to more than double by
2050, from 1.02 billion in 2017 to 2.17 billion, and then to almost double again by the
end of the century. One in four working age persons in the world could be African by
2050 – a chance for Africa to reap the demographic dividend for developing its economy.
However, the right conditions have to be in place: African youth must be well-educated
and highly-skilled, and enough jobs created, which is more difficult in the current age of
declining manufacturing and increasing automation. Unemployed and marginalised
young people may contribute to continued political instability, including terrorism.54
On the whole, not only the EU, but the entire planet is ageing. Even in regions still
experiencing high birth rates, the number of aged persons is rising rapidly. The number of
those aged 65 or older is projected to grow from an estimated 612 million in 2015 to over
1.5 billion in 2050. Most of this increase will take place in developing countries. As this trend
combines with lower fertility, most world regions will see their share of old people relative
to their working populations increase sharply, which will lead to higher old-age dependency
ratios. The EU is therefore not alone in this situation. However, very young societies, such
as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, also record, and will continue to do so, high young-age
52 According to American Economist N. Eberstadt, quoted in Why Demographic Trends Spell Trouble For
China And Russia, Forbes, - And Prosperity For US, November 2015.
53 See for example Emerging Asia risks growing old before becoming rich, Y. N. Lee, CNBC, April 2017.
54 On the issue of youth bulges and conflict, see for example Population Action International, The Security
demographic. Population and conflict after the Cold War and H. Urdal, 'The Demographics of Political
Violence: Youth Bulges, Insecurity and Conflict', in Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict and
Security in the 21st Century, 2007.
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dependency ratios, as numerous children are to be supported by working adults (see
Maps 3 and 4).
Map 3 – Total dependency ratio in 2015
Source: EPRS based on UN World Population Prospects, June 2017.
Map 4 – Total dependency ratio in 2030
Source: EPRS based on UN World Population Prospects, June 2017.
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2.3.3. Ageing and health in the world
According to the World Health Organization,55 the vast majority of older people and the
most rapidly aging populations are already to be found in less developed countries. Such
countries are experiencing a rapid increase in the number and percentage of older
people, often within a single generation – a time span much shorter than it took
developed countries to undergo the same transition. This does not necessarily entail an
increase in the demand for, and utilisation of, health services by old people: 'evidence
indicates there is a disconnect between health-care need and health-care utilisation'56 in
less developed countries. This is due to the cost of health-care visits and transportation,
and sometimes also due to the prioritisation of the health needs of younger people, often
by the old people themselves.
3. Focus on health
3.1. Is 70 the new 60?
3.1.1. Life expectancy and healthy life years
Europeans born today can expect to live long lives. In 2015, life expectancy at birth in the
EU-28 stood at 83.3 years for women and 77.9 years for men. Between 2002 and 2015,
it increased by 2.4 years and 3.4 years, respectively (see also section 2.2.1 'Increasing life
expectancy'). However, whether these longer years are also lived in good health is a
central and thorny question for policy-makers.57 Indicators focus on the years of life
spent in a healthy condition, free from the limitations of chronic and degenerative
diseases, frailty, mental health problems, and physical disability. One such indicator is
Healthy Life Years (HLY), calculated annually by Eurostat. The HLY is a composite indicator
that combines (objective) data from mortality statistics and (subjective) data on activity
limitation, assessed by means of health surveys. This may raise issues of reliability and
comparability, a caveat that needs to be factored in when considering the data (see
boxes).58
Healthy Life Years (HLY) and Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy (HALE)
This analysis is primarily based on Eurostat health data and the HLY indicator, developed under
the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010). The HLY indicator measures the number of remaining years that
a person of a specific age can expect to live without any moderate or severe health problems.
The notion of 'health problem' reflects a disability dimension and is based on a question
instrument that aims to assess the extent of an activity limitation of at least six months' duration
due to a health problem that may have affected respondents as regards their usual activities.
This is known as the Global Activity Limitation Instrument (GALI), used in the annual Eurostat
survey Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The HLY is therefore also known as
'disability-free life expectancy' (DFLE).59
55 See Global health and ageing, WHO, US National Institute of Aging, October 2011.
56 Word report on ageing and health, WHO, 2015.
57 European Commission, Health indicators.
58 Comparing trends in HLY and life expectancy can show whether extra years of life are healthy years,
whereby valid comparisons depend on the underlying health measure being reliable and comparable
(OECD/EU, Health at a Glance: Europe 2016, 2016, p. 56).
59 See also Eurostat, Healthy life years (from 2004 onwards), reference metadata. For more on HLY
methodology, see: European Community Health Indicators Monitoring (ECHIM), Documentation sheet for
indicator 40. Health Expectancy: Healthy Life Years (HLY), 2011.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) uses the Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy (HALE) indicator
for calculating healthy life expectancy at birth. HALE is defined as the average number of years
that a person can expect to live in 'full health' by taking into account years lived in less than full
health due to disease and/or injury.60
It has been pointed out that, since HALE and HLY calculations use different underlying data,
assumptions and methodologies, their outcomes are different. Indeed, it would seem that HALE
(WHO) data paint a rather more positive picture than HLY (Eurostat) data and do not vary to the
same extent. By way of example, the 2015 EU-28 average for healthy life years in absolute value
at birth (HLY, Eurostat) is 63.3 years for women and 62.6 years for men, while healthy life
expectancy at birth (HALE, WHO) is 72.3 years for women and 68.3 years for men. A comparison
suggests that, for women, HLY values range from 54.1 years in Latvia to 74.6 years in Malta, while
HALE values range from 69.2 years in Bulgaria to 74.4 years in France. For men, HLY values range
from 51.8 years in Latvia to 74 years in Sweden, while HALE values range from 62 years in Latvia
to 71.8 years in Italy. (Eurostat values are depicted in Figures 10 and 11).
A Eurostat snapshot (2014) showed that, on average, 67 % of the population aged 16 and
over in the EU-28 perceived their health to be very good or good. In comparison, 23 %
rated it as fair and 10 % as bad or very bad. The negative perception of health increased
with age, to peak among those aged 74-84 years. According to Eurostat, self-perceived
health is related both to the existence or absence of health problems and to people's
capacity to afford medical examination and treatment. In a previous analysis (2013),
Eurostat came to the following findings: self-perceived health declined with age; men
tended to report being in better health than women; people with higher income had
better self-perceived health; people in education or training and full-time employees
assessed their health most positively; the least educated had the worst self-perceived
health; and those who were able to benefit from support from others reported better
health.61 There appeared to be a strong connection between bad self-perceived health
and low life satisfaction. On the other hand, self-perceived health and severe limitations
in usual activities were not always correlated (in some Member States, only a small
proportion of people reported long-standing limitations, while a large proportion of
these countries' residents reported to be in bad or very bad health).
60 See WHO, Health Status Statistics: Mortality and Healthy life expectancy (HALE) at birth. For more on
HALE methodology, see: WHO, WHO methods for life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, 2014.
61 Eurostat, Quality of life in Europe – facts and views – health.
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Measuring health: objective data vs self-assessment
Measuring the health of a population is central to evidence-based public health policy.
Population health can be measured using a number of indicators (i.e. data sets that allow for
monitoring and comparison and can be useful for determining policy priorities), each with their
strengths and weaknesses.62 Macro or population-level indicators provide a broad picture of
health, such as life expectancy or mortality rate. While useful as tools for measuring differences
in population health across countries, they may provide little indication on the underlying
factors, such as socioeconomic characteristics (education, income level, etc.). Micro or
individual-level indicators comprise two types of health measures. Objective measures, such as
blood pressure and body mass index, are important from a clinical and health system
perspective, but may be more expensive to collect and prone to measurement error. Self-
assessed measures, such as self-perceived general health and self-reported limitations in daily
activities, are broadly available, but may be influenced by differences in perception and other
factors, including geographic location, gender, age and socioeconomic position. Cultural and
individual expectations and definitions of health also play a role. Methodological challenges also
exist in comparing measures across countries, such as differences in survey approach (e.g.,
wording of assessment questions and diverse cultural understandings).
In the most recent year for which Eurostat data is available (2015), healthy life years at
birth across the EU were estimated to average 63.3 years for women and 62.6 years for
men. The difference between women and men (the 'gender gap') in terms of self-
assessed healthy life years therefore amounted to just 0.7 years in favour of women. The
gap was thus considerably smaller than the gender gap for overall life expectancy of
5.4 years. In other words, according to their own assessment, women tend to live a
greater share of their (longer) lives with a disability or a disease, while men can expect
to spend a greater proportion of their somewhat shorter lives free from activity
limitations.63Women perceived around 76 % of their life as lived in good health, and men
80 % of theirs (see Figures 10 and 11).
The number of perceived healthy life years varied considerably between Member
States – the range between the country with the highest and lowest value was 20 years
for women and 22.2 years for men. The differences between Member States in perceived
(health-related) quality of life were much more pronounced than for life expectancy.
62 C. Masseria et al., 'What are the methodological issues related to measuring health and drawing
comparisons across countries?', The London School of Economics and Political Science/European
Commission, 2007.
63 Eurostat, Sustainable development – public health.
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Figure 10 – Life expectancy at birth 2015, females, by country, and healthy life years at birth
2015
Source: GlobalStat elaboration on Eurostat data.
Figure 11 – Life expectancy at birth 2015, males, by country, and healthy life years at birth 2015
Source: GlobalStat elaboration on Eurostat data.
Eurostat data show a decrease in the averages of self-assessed healthy life years
between 2010 and 2014 for women (0.8 years) and men (0.4 years).64 However, the 2015
averages are more positive, and looking at the 2010-2015 timespan, this would imply
average gains of 0.7 years for women and 0.8 years for men. When analysed at individual
EU Member State level, however, data show much bigger differences amongst Member
64 Eurostat, Healthy life years and life expectancy at birth, by sex, dataset.
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States and between years within the same Member State, and are not always consistent
with the averages. It is extremely difficult to draw a conclusion from these figures –
bearing in mind the self-assessed nature of survey data and the difficulty of forecasting
trends – however, they appear to suggest that people do not experience the extra life
years without limitations to their usual activity.
Of anecdotal interest is a recent EU-funded research among inhabitants of religious
institutions that set out to elucidate the 'gender and health paradox', that is, the
seemingly contradictory observation that women live longer than men in spite of
experiencing worse health. The research found that while women do typically suffer
from more chronic diseases than men, this is not because of their gender, but because
they live longer.65
3.1.2. 'Live long and prosper'
How long we live, and whether and when age-related illness strikes, can be influenced
by many factors.66 Genetic and biological characteristics, personal behaviour, socio-
economic background and the physical environment all play a role. Cancer, ischaemic
heart diseases (for example, heart attack) and cerebrovascular diseases (for example,
stroke) were among the three most common causes of death for both women and men
in the EU in 2014.67
According to the WHO, chronic diseases are a major cause of mortality and disability
worldwide. Chronic diseases are generally long-term and persistent, often leading to a
gradual deterioration of health. Many chronic diseases become more prevalent with
older age. They may not be immediately life-threatening, but can create limitations (that
is, difficulties in accomplishing everyday activities) and disability, which affects people's
quality of life. There are four main types of chronic diseases: cardiovascular diseases,
such as heart attack and stroke; cancers; chronic respiratory diseases, such as chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma; and diabetes.68 The European Commission
asserts that major and chronic diseases together are responsible for 87 % of all deaths in
the EU. As per the Commission's definition, major and chronic diseases are those
affecting at least 50 per 100 000 people. They include the four main chronic diseases as
well as mental health problems, such as depression; and neurodegenerative diseases,
such as Alzheimer's disease and other dementias.
There is broad consensus that many chronic diseases can be positively impacted by
tackling four major risk factors through lifestyle changes: smoking, alcohol abuse,
unhealthy diet and physical inactivity. A recent study found that people who do not
smoke, maintain a normal weight and consume alcohol moderately can expect to live up
to seven years longer, and to spend most of these extra years in good health.69 In
addition, mental well-being plays an important role in healthy ageing, and strong social
networks – including a broad range of relationships with family, friends, neighbours, or
community-service providers – can enhance older people's life expectancy and quality of
65 European Commission, Women get sicker but men die quicker disproved, HEMOX project results.
66 G. Finnegan, 'Who wants to live forever?', European Research Council.
67 Eurostat, Women and men in Europe – A statistical portrait, 2017 (see 1.3 Health perception).
68 WHO, Chronic diseases and health promotion and Noncommunicable diseases.
69 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, 'A healthy lifestyle increases life expectancy by up to seven years',
20 July 2017.
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life, protect against functional decline and promote resilience.70 Research suggests that
subjective well-being in later life is to a large degree dependent of psychosocial factors:
depression and anxiety, in particular, had strong negative effects, as did, in the case of
women, living alone.71
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) argues that more
than 1.2 million people across the EU died in 2013 from illnesses and injuries 'that might
have been avoided through more effective public health and prevention policies or more
timely and effective health care'.72While acknowledging that 'notable progress' has been
achieved in reducing smoking in most EU Member States, the OECD pleads for greater
efforts to tackle two growing public health issues: harmful use of alcohol and obesity.
According to the OECD, more than one in five adults in the EU reported heavy drinking
at least once a month in 2014. One in six adults was obese, compared to one in nine in
2000.
3.2. How ageing affects healthcare and health systems in the EU
3.2.1. A challenge for the sustainability of health systems
As noted in sections 1.2 and 2.1, the EU is ageing dramatically. On average across EU
Member States, the share of the population aged over 65 has increased from less than
10 % in 1960 to nearly 20 % in 2015, and it is projected to increase further to nearly 30 %
by 2060. Currently, around 50 million people in the EU live with two or more chronic
conditions ('multi-morbidity'), and most of these people are over 65. The risk of having a
physical or mental disability that leads to a situation of dependency requiring long-term
care tends to increase with age, especially with very old age (80 years and over).73
According to Eurostat, government expenditure on health in 2015 accounted for just
over 1 trillion euros (€1 058 billion) or 7.2 % of GDP in the EU.74 The OECD's estimate for
2015 is slightly higher (9.9 % of EU GDP), possibly because the health part of long-term
care is included under health expenditure. The Commission's 2015 Ageing Report lays
out two reasons why ageing may pose a risk for the sustainability of healthcare financing:
(1) increased life expectancy, without an improvement in health status, leads to a higher
demand for healthcare services over a longer period of lifetime. This increases total
lifetime healthcare expenditure and overall healthcare spending; (2) Since ageing leads
to an increase in the old-age dependency ratio (see glossary), far fewer people will
contribute to finance public healthcare, while a growing share of older people may
require additional healthcare services. As the report points out, projections of age-
related public expenditure are fraught with uncertainty, and the crux is whether gains in
life expectancy are spent in good or bad health: if all extra life years are experienced as
healthy life years, the additional cost burden from ageing can be lowered. Improvements
in health status may be crucial for keeping expenditure on healthcare under control in
the future. Other commentators assert that the extension of healthy old age may only
temporarily mitigate the expected increases in healthcare costs. Chronic disease and
disability may drive up costs in the longer-term, given that the increasing proportion of
70 A. Zaidi et al., 'Measuring active and healthy ageing in Europe', Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 27,
Issue 2, 2017.
71 Helmholtz Zentrum München – German Research Center for Environmental Health, 'Well-being in later
life: The mind plays an important role', 1 July 2017.
72 OECD/EU, Health at a Glance: Europe 2016, 2016.
73 European Commission, The 2015 Ageing Report, 2015.
74 Eurostat, Member States spent over €1000 billion on health, 25 August 2017.
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those aged eighty and over would have more extensive and expensive healthcare
needs.75
3.2.2. Looking for new solutions
In its communication on effective, accessible and resilient health systems, the European
Commission points to the growing common challenges EU health systems face:
increasing cost; an ageing population with an associated rise of chronic diseases and
multi-morbidity, leading to growing demand for healthcare; shortages of health
professionals; and inequities in access to healthcare.76 According to the Commission, EU
Member States' ability to provide universal and equitable access to high-quality care will
depend on making health systems more resilient and better able to cope with the
challenges ahead, while at the same time remaining cost-effective and sustainable.
The OECD makes the case that population ageing, combined with budgetary constraints,
will require profound adaptations to the EU Member States' health systems, to promote
more healthy ageing and respond in a more integrated and patient-centred way to
changing healthcare needs. This implies the need for Member States 'to improve the
resilience of health systems to be able to respond to new needs in the most efficient
way', and for health systems to remain fiscally sustainable.
According to the European Commission's independent expert panel on effective ways of
investing in health, disruptive innovation (creating new networks and new organisational
cultures involving new players) may be important for improving health and healthcare in
Europe:
'Health systems must change fundamentally to survive but there are cultural, economic,
institutional, legal, organisational and workforce barriers to change. Each of these
requires a different approach. Policy-makers need to exercise leadership and find the
courage to bring all interests together to find difficult compromise.' 77
3.2.3. What can the EU do?
The EU has a supporting competence in health (Article 168 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union): the Member States are responsible for defining
their health policy and for organising and delivering health services, which includes the
management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources
assigned to them. Against this background, EU health policy focuses, among other things,
on prevention – especially by promoting healthier lifestyles – and on keeping people
healthy into old age. Specific EU action involves providing the Member States with tools
to help them cooperate and identify best practice (for instance, health promotion
activities) and funding health projects through the EU health programme. More
concretely, the European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing (EIP-
AHA), launched in 2011, aims to increase the average healthy lifespan of Europeans by
two years by 2020.78 It sets out to do so by: improving health and quality of life; ensuring
75 M.J. Burrows, Reducing the risks from rapid demographic change, Atlantic Council, 2016.
76 European Commission, Communication on effective, accessible and resilient health systems,
COM(2014) 215.
77 Expert panel on effective ways of investing in health, Disruptive innovation, 2016.
78 European Commission, European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing.
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that health and social care systems are sustainable and efficient; and creating growth
and market opportunities for business.79
Focus is growing on new digital solutions that can contribute to ageing well. The
Commission's eHealth action plan 2012-2020 recognised that 'fostering a spirit of
innovation in eHealth in Europe is the way forward to ensure better health and better
and safer care for EU citizens', especially given that EU health systems are under severe
budgetary constraints, while having to respond to the challenges of an ageing
population, among other issues.80 Research in digital health for healthy ageing is funded
under Horizon 2020, the EU's framework programme for research and innovation. For
example, the ongoing MARIO (Managing active and healthy aging with use of caring
service robots) project addresses the challenges of loneliness, isolation and dementia in
older persons through innovative interventions delivered by service robots.81
'State of health in the EU' initiative 2016-2017
'State of health' is a two-year joint exercise between the European Commission, the OECD, the
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies and the EU Member States. It aims to bring
together internationally recognised expertise in an effort to boost analytical capacity and support
Member States in their evidence-based policy making. Four deliverables are included: (1) the
biennial 'Health at a Glance: Europe' report (the latest edition was published in November 2017);
(2) a set of individual country health profiles for each Member State with a companion report,
developed by the OECD and the Observatory in cooperation with the Commission (released in
November 2017); (3) a Commission paper to accompany the country health profiles, linking them
to the broader EU agenda; and (4) voluntary exchanges to discuss concrete implications of the
findings and how to make best use of the evidence (as soon as the second and third deliverable
are released).82
3.3. Young people and health
Young people (those aged from 15 to 29 years) make up an estimated 17.4 % of the
EU-28 population. They are generally in better health and feel healthier than older age
groups: in 2013, 92 % of the EU's young population declared that they were in 'good' or
'very good' health. At the same time, 12 % of the young reported suffering from a chronic
disease or long-standing health problem, and 8 % declared they had health-related
limitations to their usual activities of longer than six months. Both the health problems
and the activity limitations varied according to gender and income level (see also the
discussion on objective vs self-assessed measures of health in section 3.1).
A number of health-related behaviours that are established in adolescence not only
affect health at the time, but also contribute to chronic diseases in adulthood.83 For
instance, childhood obesity remains a considerable public health problem in the EU.
Excess weight in childhood and adolescence is associated with a number of serious
health consequences, and it is thought to place an economic burden on healthcare
systems. On the other hand, some behaviours begun in young adulthood can play a
79 In a reply to a June 2017 parliamentary question on whether the objective set by the EIP-AHA can still
be achieved, Health and Food Safety Commissioner Vytenis Andriukaitis reaffirmed that the EIP-AHA
partners remain committed to the goal.
80 European Commission, Communication: eHealth Action Plan 2012-2020 – Innovative healthcare for the
21st century, COM(2012) 736.
81 European Union-funded project, MARIO.
82 European Commission, State of the Health in the EU.
83 WHO, Adolescent's health-related behaviours.
Demographic outlook in the European Union 2017 Page 31 of 32
positive role in health in development – for instance, healthy eating and adequate
physical activity – or may prevent health problems. Recent research is a case in point in
favour of early prevention: according to the study, people who took steps to keep their
heart healthy in young adulthood, such as exercising, eating a healthy diet, controlling
blood pressure and cholesterol, reducing blood sugar and avoiding or stopping smoking,
had higher brain volume in later adulthood (brain volume loss, or shrinking, has been
associated with the onset of Alzheimer's disease and other dementias).84 The EU
supports the health and well-being of young people in a number of ways. The EU youth
strategy, for instance, has a health focus on:
 promoting mental and sexual health, sport, physical activity and healthy lifestyles;
 preventing and treating injury, eating disorders, addictions and substance abuse;
 education on nutrition;
 promoting cooperation between schools, youth
workers, health professionals and sport
organisations.85
Moreover, the EU supports Member States' efforts to
tackle childhood obesity, including with the EU action
plan on childhood obesity 2014-2020.86
Lastly, young people's health-related behaviour is
strongly influenced by social and environmental factors. In this context, an EU-funded
project is looking into ways of harnessing the possibilities for health communication
offered by social media.87 Researchers have developed a 'wearable lab' bracelet that can
track the activities and interactions of adolescents in small social media circles. By
identifying the most influential teens, they intend to explore creating the positive peer
pressure that influences young people to live healthier lives.
4. Prospects
As noted in section 1.3 'Focus on adapting to ageing demographics', the broad
demographic outlook at the EU level is essentially set in the short to medium term.
Fertility rates and life expectancy in the EU are unlikely to change suddenly and even if
they did, the effect would not be immediate. As we have seen in recent years, migration
flows can change rapidly and dramatically. However, even at the unprecedented levels
of the last few years, they cannot, at EU level at least, radically change demographic
destiny on their own. The EU population will be slow growing and continue to age
significantly for now, whilst also forming a decreasing proportion of the world
population.
However, whilst this demographic outlook is relatively set in the shorter term, changes
to fertility rates, life expectancy and migration which may happen in the coming years
can build up over time to change the situation in the longer term. EU level fertility rate
84 M.P. Bancks et al., 'Cardiovascular health in young adulthood and structural brain MRI in midlife – The
CARDIA study', Neurology, 19 July 2017.
85 European Commission, EU Youth Strategy: Health and well-being.
86 European Commission, EU Action Plan on Childhood Obesity 2014-2020, 2014.
87 European Commission, 'Social media peer pressure used to help adolescents live healthier lives',
Horizon – The EU Research and Innovation Magazine, 30 June 2017.
Health matters to millennials
According to research presented at a
2016 Committee of the Regions
conference, millennials (generally being
regarded as people born between 1977
and 1995) regard health, equality,
education and job creation as priorities,
with health taking first place.
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averages have recovered a little from their mid-1990s lows and the wide variation
between Member States suggests there is nothing inherently 'fixed' about current levels.
EU average life expectancy gains have been slowing somewhat and the 2015 data saw a
(small) surprise drop in life expectancy. Whether the previous rising trend for life
expectancy continues, and if so to what level, will have to await further data.
Developments on migration are also, by their nature, rather uncertain. With an ageing
EU and significant population growth in the form of a 'youth bulge' expected in some
other parts of the world, notably Africa, the potential for substantial migration in-flows
nevertheless clearly remains.
Below the EU level, free movement and external migration also influences demography
at Member State and regional level. This affects both the size of the population in
countries and regions and their age profile, for instance as younger people move to more
economically dynamic areas for work. These interact with the different patterns of
fertility and life expectancy across the EU.
Looking beyond the EU populations' size and age profile, the outlook for healthy life
expectancy is clearly important both to individuals and governments. Apart from the
personal impact, long periods of poor health in older age imply high expenditure on
health and social care and limit opportunities for longer working to support incomes and
the wider economy. Whilst it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from the data, it does
suggest that people are not experiencing the extra life years stemming from increased
life expectancy without limitations to their usual activity. New data may shed more light
on this situation in future.
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This paper presents the demographic outlook in the
European Union (EU) in 2017. It shows that the EU
population, having grown substantially, is now beginning
to stagnate, before its expected decline from around the
middle of the century. With the world population having
risen still more substantially and growth continuing, the
EU represents a shrinking proportion of the world
population. The EU population is also ageing dramatically,
as life expectancy increases and fertility rates are lower
than in the past. This has serious implications across a
range of areas including the economy, healthcare and
pensions. Free movement within the EU and migration
from third countries also plays an important role in
shaping demography in individual Member States and
regions. The 'in-focus' section of this analysis looks at
health and notes that the data, whilst inconsistent,
suggests that people are not necessarily experiencing the
extra life years without limitations to their usual activity.
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